CST Financial Services, LLC v. Mike McCabe, Mike McCabe Trucking, Bill Strickland, and Strickly Truckin Inc. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2009
CST Financial Services, LLC v. Mike McCabe,
Mike McCabe Trucking, Bill Strickland, and
Strickly Truckin Inc. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dusten Heugly; attorney for appellee.
Gary Buhler; attorney for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, CST Financial v. McCabe, No. 20090392 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2009).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1661
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
CST FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Vs. 
MIKE MCCABE, individually, MIKE 
MCCABE TRUCKING, BILL 
STRICKLAND, individually and 
STRICKLY TRUCKIN INC. 
Defendants and Appellant 
Appellate Court No20090392-CA 
Trial Court No. 050909240 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from the final order granting the plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment issued, by the Honorable L. A. Dever, Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, Utah, entered in this matter on April 15, 2099. 
The parties involved in the appeal are Strickly Truckin Inc., Appellant and one of 
three on'gina! defendants and CST Financial Services, LLC the plaintiff and Appellee. 
Mike McCabe, individually, Mike McCabe Trucking, and Bill Strickland, 
individually as the remaining defendants at trial are not involved with this appeal. 
Dusten Heugly 
1375 South 100 East 
Price UT 84501 
Telephone: (435) 
Fax (435) 
Attorney for Plaintiff /Appellee 
CST Financial Services, LLC 
Gary Buhler #7039 
P.O. Box 229 
Grantsville, Utah 84029-0229 
Telephone: (435) 884-0354 
FAX: (435) 884-6509 
Attorney for Defendant / Appellant 
Strickly Truckin Inc. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
SEP ** 2009 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
CST FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
Vs. 
MIKE MCCABE, individually, MIKE 
MCCABE TRUCKING, BILL 
STRICKLAND, individually and 
STRICKLY TRUCKIN INC. 
Defendants and Appellant 
Appellate Court No20090392-CA 
Trial Court No. 050909240 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from the final order granting the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment issued by the Honorable L. A. Dever, Third Judicial District Court, in and for 
Salt Lake County, Utah, entered in this matter on April 15, 2099. 
The parties involved in the appeal are Strickly Truckin Inc., Appellant and one of 
three original defendants and CST Financial Services, LLC the plaintiff and Appellee. 
Mike McCabe, individually, Mike McCabe Trucking, and Bill Strickland, 
individually as the remaining defendants at trial are not involved with this appeal. 
Dusten Heugly 
1375 South 100 East 
Price UT 84501 
Telephone: (435) 
Fax (435) 
Attorney for Plaintiff /Appellee 
CST Financial Services, LLC 
Gary Buhler #7039 
P.O. Box 229 
Grantsville, Utah 84029-0229 
Telephone: (435) 884-0354 
FAX: (435) 884-6509 
Attorney for Defendant / Appellant 
Strickly Truckin Inc. 
1.181 OF ALL PARTUS 
CST FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC; Plaintiff and Appellee 
MIKE MCCABE, individually; Defendant 
MIKE MCCABE TRUCKING; Defendant 
BILL STRICKLAND, individually; Defendant - - Dismissed 
STRICKLY TRUCKIN INC.; Defendant and Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
T.-ihlo of Authorities 4 
Jurisdictional Statement 4 
Statement'if Issues ar f Review 4 
Statutory Provisions 3 
Statement of the Case 9 
Summary of Argument 26 
/ nt 27 
Conclusion 1 
3u.)i nt uif DI i'i iiiiiM-'l nt Kr.'i nnl it nl Niiilini] i i.'ililn.dli1 42 
Addendum 
Addendum 1; Temporary Lease 1 - 2 
Addendum 2; CST Letter 3 
Addendum 3, Invoice from CST to Strickly #3215 4 
Addendum 4, Invoice from CST to Strickly #3381 5 
Addendum 5, Summary of McCabe's unpaid expenses 6 
Addendum 6, CST Invoice #3283 7 
Addendum 7, July invoice with deductions for engine repair .. 8 
Addendum 8, August invoice with deductions for engine repah ... 9 
Addendum 9, CST Proposed Orde- " -13 
Addendum 10, Seagull Repair Ril' ..14 
Minute Entry of April 15, 2009 ""--20 
2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Anderson v. Taylor 2006 UT 79 25, 39 
Blacknerv. State, 2002 UT44, H8, 48 P.3d 949 7 
Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure §1356 (2d ed. 1990) 28 
Copper State Leasing, 770 P.2d 88 at 91 6, 7,17, 34 
Crestwood Cove Apartments Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, 1110, 164 P.3d 1247.. 7 
E.g., Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 
UT 101,1f9, 104 P.3d 1226 5, 6, 29 
General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 
545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976) 6, 7, 17, 34 
Gerhich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999) 38 
Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84,1f 5, 173 P.3d 166 7 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, P 24, 48 P.3d 235 6, 18, 36 
Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., 2005 UT 82,1|2, 128 P.3d 7 
McCabeDowell v. Sullivan, 132 F.R.D. 501, 502 (N.D.III.1990) 36 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 39 
Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 4 
Sacklerv. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220 (Utah 1995) 7 
Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Redy Mix, Inc., 2004 UT23, H23 25, 39 
Speros v. Fricke, 98 P.3d 28, 33-34 (Utah 2004) 38 
Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir.1989) 36 
UCA 70A-9a-406 24,35 
URCPRule12 18 
3 
URCP Rule 12(b)(6) 4, 5, 6, 10, 18, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 35, 41 
URCP Rule 56 (c) 38 
URCP Rule 56 38 
URCP Rule 6. Time 8 
URCP Rule 60(b) 19,20 
URCP Rule 61: Harmless Error 21 
URCP Rule 7(c)(1) 19, 28 
URCP Rule 7(f)(2) 21, 29 
URCP Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b) 9 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102 4 
Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-103 4 
Utah Constitution Art. I; Section 11 5, 8, 29, 41 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann 
§78A-3-102 and §78A-4-103 which placed the matter before the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, and the Order dated May 13, 2009 which transferred the matter from the 
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition pursuant to Rule 42(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure as of June 3, 2009. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE ONE: Did the trial court deny the defendant Strickly Truckin Inc., its 
constitutional right to a have remedy without unnecessary delay by (1) failing to rule 
upon Strickly's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss for more than 1,270 days after it was 
filed with the Court; 
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(2) by allowing the plaintiff CST more than 90 days after the court entered the default 
judgement against CST for CST to file its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set 
Aside Default Certificate, although it never filed any Motion to Set Aside Default 
Certificate; (3) by allowing the plaintiff CST more than 100 days after the November 
2006 hearing to serve Strickly with the proposed findings and order to set aside the 
default judgement although the plaintiff never filed the proposed findings and order with 
the court; (4) by allowing the plaintiff CST 830 days, after the court set aside the default 
judgement against CST, to file its Memorandum of Points and Authorities Concerning 
Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss with the court. 
Standard of review: We review a district court's decision to dismiss a cause of 
action under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for correctness. E.g., Oakwood Vill. 
LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, 1f 9, 104 P.3d 1226. 
Determinative law: Utah Constitution Art. I; Section 11, [Courts open - Redress of 
injuries] All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay. 
ISSUE TWO: Did the court make a correct decision by denying Strickly's 
12(b)(6) motion without making any findings that supported the ruling that CST had 
sufficiently stated its claims of Breach of Contract and Fraud, where Strickly claimed 
there was no valid allegation of the formation of a contract supported by consideration 
between CST and Strickly made in CST's complaint. Without a contract between CST 
and Strickly, there could be no Fraud by Strickly. 
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Standard of review: We review a district court's decision to dismiss a cause of 
action under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for correctness. E.g., Oakwood Vill. 
LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, If 9, 104 P.3d 1226. "[W]e accept the factual 
allegations in the complaint as true and interpret those facts and all inferences drawn 
from them in the light most favorable the non-moving party." Id. 
Determinative law: Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, P 24, 48 P.3d 235 
In order to establish fraudulent concealment, "a plaintiff must prove the following 
three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to 
communicate." 
Copper State Leasing, 770 P.2d 88 at 91 (citing General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976)). 
"If there is no consideration, there is no contract." "Consideration is an act or 
promise, bargained for and given in exchange for a promise.. . . For the mutual 
promises of the parties to a bilateral contract to constitute the consideration for each 
other, the promises must be binding on both parties." 
ISSUE THREE: Did the court correctly conclude that CST was entitled to a 
Summary Judgment against Strickly when it interpreted the CST/McCabe Factoring 
Agreement to be a contract binding upon Strickly that required Strickly to pay CST 
amounts in excess of what it owed to McCabe under the preexisting lease agreement 
between Strickly and McCabe and when it entered summary judgment in favor of CST 
based upon a contractual obligation of Strickly to CST, without making any specific 
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findings for the basis of the contractual obligation or the terms of the contract and 
where other than Implied consideration" no consideration between the parties was ever 
alleged by CST. 
Standard of review: Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law." Crestwood Cove Apartments Bus. Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, 
1110, 164 P.3d 1247 (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a grant of 
summary judgment, we review the district court's conclusions of law for correctness 
and give them no deference. Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, U 5, 
173 P.3d 166; Blackner v. State, 2002 UT 44, fl 8, 48 P.3d 949. We review the facts 
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and make any reasonable 
inferences in their favor. Johnson v. Hermes Assocs., 2005 UT 82, U 2, 128 P.3d 
1151. The appellate Court reviews the trial Court's interpretation of a contact for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial Court. Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 
1220 (Utah 1995). 
Determinative law: "If there is no consideration, there is no contract." Copper 
State Leasing, 770 P.2d 88 at 91 (citing General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty 
Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976)). "Consideration is an act or promise, bargained 
for and given in exchange for a promise. . . . For the mutual promises of the parties to a 
bilateral contract to constitute the consideration for each other, the promises must be 
binding on both parties." 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
AND CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 
Utah Constitution Art. I; Section 11, [Courts open -Redress of injuries] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be 
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from 
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself, or counsel, any 
civil cause to which he is a party. 1896. 
URCP Rule 6. Time 
(a) Computation. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these 
rules, by the local rules of any district court, by order of court, or by any 
applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated 
period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so 
computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, 
in which event the period runs until the end of the next day that is not a 
Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or 
allowed, without reference to any additional time provided under subsection (e), 
is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays shall 
be excluded in the computation. 
(b) Enlargement. When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by 
order of the court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified 
time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or 
without motion or notice order the period enlarged if request therefor is made 
before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a 
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previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified 
period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of 
excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under 
Rules 50(b), 52(b), 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b), except to the extent and under 
the conditions stated in them. 
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; 
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. Within ten days after service 
of the motion and supporting memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall 
file a memorandum in opposition. 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party 
shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a 
proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the 
proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing 
the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or 
upon expiration of the time to object. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
TO INCLUDE RELEVANT FACTS 
This is an action brought by a factoring company to recover moneys that were 
advanced to a semi truck owner/operator under a factoring agreement, but that were 
not paid in full by the person to whom the advances were made nor by the trucking 
company for whom the owner/operator had been performing services under a Lease 
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agreement. When the owner/operator quit working for the trucking company, they 
reconciled the accounts due to, and from the owner/operator and found he had been 
overpaid by about $17,000.00. At that time, the trucking company stopped paying any 
further invoices from the factoring company and asked for a refund of the money they 
had paid to the factoring company but that was not owing to the owner/operator. 
On May 20, 2005 the factoring company filed this breach of contract action 
alleging breach of contract and fraud against the owner/operator and the trucking 
company. On June 8, 2005, the trucking company served the factoring company with 
its 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the action against it along with a supporting 
memorandum. On January 9, 2009, CST filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Request for Oral Argument along with a supporting memorandum and the Affidavit of 
Karla Harris. On April 15, 2009, the court entered its minute entry wherein it denied the 
trucking company's 12(b)(6) motion and granted CST's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and stated that "This entry stands as the Order of the Court. No further order is 
required" It is from this order that the trucking company appeals to the Court of 
Appeals. 
FACTS 
Strickly Truckin, Inc., is a small family owned trucking company located in and 
operating from Grantsville Utah with Tracy Strickland serving as the company's 
president and bookkeeper while her husband William Strickland drives and performs as 
the general operations manager. While the company owns a few vehicles and has a 
few employees, many of its operating trucks are owned by owner-operators who lease 
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their personally owned trucks to Strickly Truckin along with their personal services as 
the operators for those leased trucks. 
Strickly/McCabe Lease of 2003 
The Defendant Mike McCabe was one such owner/operator who entered into a 
Temporary Lease agreement with Strickly on September 12, 2003. As with all other 
leases made by Strickly, the Strickly/McCabe Lease required Strickly to pay McCabe for 
his labor and use of his equipment in exchange for McCabe using his equipment to haul 
loads for Strickly. Under the terms of the Lease, McCabe was solely responsible for all 
expenses related to the operation and repair of his personally owned truck. (Addendum 
1; Temporary Lease; ^6, 7) 
By mutual agreement, Strickly allowed McCabe to use its credit resources to 
purchase the fuel, repairs, supplies, and services required by McCabe's trucking 
operations. All such costs due reimbursement to Strickly from McCabe were authorized 
by the Lease to be, and were, routinely deducted from the compensation paid to 
McCabe before the checks for the balance were issued to McCabe. (Addendum 1, 1J5) 
Until January 2004, McCabe would submit an invoice to Strickly for the work completed 
at the end of each project and Strickly would deduct the expenses it had previously paid 
to the benefit of McCabe from the amounts due under the current invoice. As required 
by the Lease, Strickly would then issue a check to McCabe for the remaining balance 
due for the given project. Under this Lease, Strickly was obligated to pay no more than 
the agreed price for the work completed by McCabe, less all deductions for the credit 
extended by Strickly to McCabe for expenses previously incurred by McCabe. 
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McCabe/CST Factoring Agreement 
In January 2004, Strickly received an unsolicited Letter by Fax from the plaintiff 
CST Financial Services, concerning the assignment of McCabe's accounts receivables 
to CST. (Addendum 2; CST Letter) 
Although the document contained incomplete and nonsensical sentences, such 
as a reference in the third paragraph to some unknown document that was supposedly 
signed by CSTs Agent and notarized but was not attached, Tracy Strickland 
understood the "Letter" to be a notice of McCabe's assignment to CST of his accounts 
receivable and a request that Strickly mail the money Strickly owed to McCabe for work 
completed, less the normal deductions for McCabe's expenses, made payable to CST 
rather than to McCabe. 
The "Letter" said nothing about any compensation from CST for the extra 
services requested of Strickly. The "Letter" said nothing whatsoever about Strickly 
somehow becoming contractually obligated to pay any amount more than that which 
was actually due to McCabe after all applicable deductions for credit provided to 
McCabe by Strickly had been made. 
Before Tracy signed the letter acknowledging that Strickly would mail the money 
actually due from Strickly to McCabe to CST, as requested in the fourth paragraph, she 
confirmed with McCabe that he had made a factoring agreement with CST. 
Because McCabe, had asked Strickly to forward the balance of the payments 
due to him after all allowable deductions had been subtracted to CST at the address 
requested in the letter, Strickly began making the payments due to McCabe to CST. 
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At that time, McCabe began to submit his invoices to CST rather than to Strickly 
and CST would place their sticker on the McCabe invoice and rubber stamp it with 
mailing instructions for the payment. Over time, CST submitted several invoices to 
Strickly as demand for payment and Strickly paid said invoices from CST for McCabe's 
work upon receipt based upon the invoices received from CST. During the period from 
January 2004 until August 2004, Strickly received invoices from CST claiming it was 
due the total gross amount of $68,661.39 less deductions for fuel and the broker's 10% 
fee in the total net amount due of $51,793.25. [Rec Index Pg 161] During that period, 
Strickly paid CST $38,379.84 based upon the invoices it had received from CST less 
the expense deductions. [Rec Index Pg 161] 
Expense reimbursement due to Strickly from McCabe 
In May, 2004, McCabe needed a major repair to the engine of his truck in order 
to keep operating. With McCabe's acknowledgement that Strickly was entitled to regain 
all of the advanced money as provided in the Lease, to be taken as deductions from the 
compensation due to McCabe for his future services, Strickly agreed to advance 
McCabe the $13,178.01 necessary to pay for the repair of his truck's engine and 
thereafter made arrangements with the repair company to pay the repair bill over time. 
(Addendum 10; Seagull Repair Bill showing Strickly payment schedule) Over the 
following five month period, Strickly paid the full amount of the repair bill to the repair 
shop as agreed. 
Because the $13,000 could not be deducted from McCabe all at one time, both 
Strickly and McCabe agreed that Strickly would deduct the repair expenses from 
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McCabe's invoices at the monthly rate of $3,000.00 as soon as McCabe could better 
afford the monthly deductions. 
In July 2004, Strickly received an invoice from CST (Addendum 3; Invoice from 
CST to Strickly #3215 dated 7/12/2004) that showed the first $3,000.00 monthly 
deduction for the $13,000 engine repair as allowed by the Lease and as required by the 
subsequent monthly payment agreement between Strickly and McCabe. 
In August 2004, Strickly received an invoice from CST (Addendum 4; Invoice 
from CST to Strickly #3381 dated 8/13/2004) that showed the second $3,000.00 
deduction for the $13,178.01 engine repair. 
Although it was CST that sent the two invoices showing deductions for engine 
repair to Strickly, in paragraph 28 on page 33 of the Harris Affidavit made in support of 
CST's MSJ Memorandum [Rec Index Pg 201], CST claimed as its first notice of the 
debt due to Strickly from McCabe that only after McCabe quit work did CST receive a 
$13,718.01 invoice for repairs to McCabe's truck engine. 
In late August 2004, without prior notice, McCabe abandoned the Lease. Prior 
to the time McCabe abandoned the Lease, Strickly was only able to collect a total of 
$6,000.00 of the $13,178.01 owed by McCabe to Strickly for the engine repair via 
deductions from the CST invoices leaving a balance of $7,178.01 due from McCabe to 
Strickly for the engine repair. [Rec Index Pg 202] 
Once it was discovered that McCabe had abandoned the Lease, Strickly stopped 
any further payments to CST pending a reconciliation of McCabe's accounts. Strickly 
then conducted a complete review of all prior fuel, repair, and service invoices it had 
14 
received from McCabe, to include the actual job documents going back to September 
2003 as well as the invoices received from CST after January 2004. 
That reconciliation of McCabe's accounts revealed that, in addition to the unpaid 
balance of $7,178.01 for the engine repair, McCabe owed Strickly a total of $9,543.46 
for various other repairs and expenses due under the terms of the Lease agreement. 
(Addendum 5; Summary of McCabe's unpaid expenses) The review also showed CST 
had not deducted $357.75 for the Broker's fee in one of its invoices as required by the 
Lease. (Addendum 6, CST Invoice #3283) 
Upon completion, the review of the McCabe/CST accounts determined that at 
the time he abandoned the Lease, altogether McCabe owed Strickly $17,261.47 for 
expenses Strickly had incurred by McCabe's use of Strickly's credit. Because Strickly 
had already paid CST $38,379.84 towards the invoices received from CST, while CST 
was claiming McCabe and/or Strickly still owed it $13,055.66 for payments it had 
advanced to McCabe, the overall result was that Strickly had overpaid CST/McCabe 
$4,205.81. 
Strickly informed CST of this overpayment and demanded a refund in that 
amount from CST. 
The Complaint 
On May 20, 2005, instead of reimbursing Strickly for the overpayment it had 
received from Strickly based upon the invoices it had sent to Strickly, CST filed the 
complaint in this matter alleging in paragraph #33 [Rec Index Pg 5] that Strickly 
(Broker) had breached a contract with CST by not paying it the $8,655.96 CST had 
demanded from McCabe and from Strickly and also alleging in paragraph #14 that 
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Strickly (Broker) had failed to notify CST of the engine repair and that the repair was not 
reflected on the bills submitted by CST to Strickly thus causing CST to overpay 
McCabe. In paragraph #14 of its Complaint [Rec Index Pg 3], CST also stated that 
".. . CST advanced Trucker more money on the bill submitted by Trucker than Broker 
actually owed CST and Trucker" 
CST claims, in paragraph #39 and 41 of its complaint [Rec Index Pg 6], that 
Strickly committed a fraud upon CST because Strickly (Broker) failed to notify CST that 
the bills submitted by CST [to Strickly] did not reflect the repairs done to McCabe's 
truck. CSTs claim that before he quit, it did not know of the engine repair and therefore 
overpaid McCabe, was a material misrepresentation made by CST to the Court. The 
July 12, 2004 invoice to Strickly from CST (Addendum 3) clearly showed the first 
$3,000.00 deduction for the $13,000 engine repair due to Strickly as did the August 13, 
2004 invoice to Strickly from CST (Addendum 4). 
The falsity of the claim that CST had no knowledge of the engine repair thereby 
overpaying McCabe can also be seen in exhibits 22 [Rec Index Pg 460] and 24 [Rec 
Index Pg 503] to CSTs Motion for Summary Judgment wherein CST provided the Court 
with McCabe's July and August invoices to CST which both clearly show the first two 
$3,000.00 deductions for the engine repair. (Addendum 7 & 8; July and August invoices 
with deductions for engine repair) 
Although CST correctly stated in paragraph 9 of its complaint [Rec Index Pg 2] 
that Strickly was to send "allpayments otherwise due Trucker directly to CST" and in 
paragraph #27 of its complaint [Rec Index Pg 4] that Strickly's obligations to pay 
anyone were limited to payment for the work done by McCabe for Strickly, CST never 
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stated any allegation that Strickly owed any money to McCabe other than what had 
been previously paid by Strickly to McCabe's benefit. 
The Proceedings 
On May 27, 2005 Strickly was served the CST summons and complaint. 
On June 8, 2005 Strickly served CST with its 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 
action against Strickly Truckin Inc., along with a supporting memorandum. 
On June 14, 2005 Strickly filed its motion and supporting memorandum with the 
court. In the supporting memorandum, Strickly stated its position to be that CSTs 
Second cause of action for breach of contract, as stated against Strickly, was legally 
deficient and therefore should be dismissed because, in its complaint, CST had failed to 
make any allegation whatsoever that there had ever been any consideration that could 
be deemed to be sufficient to support the formation of a contract between CST and 
Strickly, citing Copper State Leasing, 770 P.2d 88 at 91 "If there is no consideration, 
there is no contract"). Strickly also cited to General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero 
Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1976). "Consideration is an act or promise, 
bargained for and given in exchange for a promise.... For the mutual promises of the 
parties to a bilateral contract to constitute the consideration for each other, the 
promises must be binding on both parties." 
Strickly's stated position was also that CSTs Third cause of action for fraud, as 
stated against Strickly, was legally deficient and therefore should be dismissed because 
in its complaint, CST (1) had failed to allege any fact that could conceivably establish 
Strickly had a contractual or any other legal duty to report to CST that CSTs bills to 
Strickly did not reflect a previous repair to McCabe's truck and (2) that CST had failed 
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to allege any fact that could establish Strickly knew of, but did not disclose, the material 
fact that CST's bills to Strickly did not reflect a repair to McCabe's truck; citing 
Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, P 24, 48 P.3d 235; "In order to establish fraudulent 
concealment, "a plaintiff must prove the following three elements: (1) the nondisclosed 
information is material, (2) the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to 
disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to communicate." 
On June 24, 2005, 16 days after it served CST with its 12(b)(6) motion, Strickly 
filed a notice to submit its motion for decision with the court. 
On June 27, 2005,19 days after Strickly served CST with its 12(b)(6) motion 
dismiss, the court granted the motion. 
On June 30, 2005, 22 days after Strickly served CST with the 12(b)(6) motion, 
although the URCP require a response within 10 days, CST filed its response to the 
12(b)(6) motion with the court along with an unsigned "Affidavit of Karla Harris" dated 
June 27, 2005. In the first paragraph on page 2 of that response [Rec Index Pg 28], 
CST cites the Harris affidavit to establish "In that there are numerous agreements 
between the parties, consideration was given and that Plaintiff is not required to 
specifically allege consideration" In paragraph #4 on page 3 of that response [Rec 
Index Pg 29], CST claims it had alleged consideration between itself and Strickly in its 
complaint "by implication" In the second paragraph of the argument on page 5 of 
CST's responsefRec Index Pg 31], CST cites URCP Rule 12 to support its argument 
that Strickly's motion to dismiss should have been treated by the court as a motion for 
summary judgment 
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On July 11, 2005 Strickly filed a "Clarification of Entry of Order to Dismiss" with 
the court giving the court notice that its "notice to submit" had erroneously stated June 
27th rather than the correct date of June 28th as the day its motion would be ready for 
decision. However, by that time, the Court had already entered the order. 
On October 3, 2005, 98 days after the court entered the order to dismiss after 
default, CST filed its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate, 
although it never filed any Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate. In the first paragraph 
on page 4 of the Memorandum [Rec Index Pg 58], CST admits it was required to 
respond to the 12(b)(6) motion no later than June 27, 2005. Along with the 
Memorandum, CST's counsel filed his Affidavit of Plaintiff's Attorney Dusten L. Heugly, 
where, in paragraph #8 [Rec Index Pg 66], he claimed under oath that he had filed his 
Response to the Motion to Dismiss in a timely manner because "the Court had allowed 
me to fax the pleading . . . " 
On October 5, 2005 Strickly served CST with its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate and filed the same with the court on October 7, 
2005. In that filing, Strickly reminded the court that CST had failed to comply with 
URCP Rule 7(c)(1) when it filed a supporting memorandum but failed to file the 
supported motion and that CST had violated URCP Rule 60(b) in that the relied upon 
portion of the Rule required CST to file its motion "not more than three months after'1 the 
entry of the objectionable order, but that more than three months had actually past 
between June 27, 2005 and October 3, 2005, when CST did finally file its Memorandum 
with the court. 
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On October 17, 2005, CST filed its Response to Memorandum in Opposition to 
Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate. In the second full paragraph on page 3 of the 
response [Rec Index Pg 74], CST claimed that "The Court should set aside the Default 
based upon subsection 6 [of URCP Rule 60(b)] because of Strickly's failure to abide 
standards of conduct and Rules of Civility and Professionalism." 
On November 14, 2006, the court heard the parties' oral arguments concerning 
CST's Motion to Set Aside the Default Certificate. At the hearing, CST's counsel 
admitted that he knew the due date for his response was June 27, 2005 [Rec Index Pg 
603 Tr. 3 Line 1 -2] . CST also admitted that even if the court had signed the order to 
dismiss on June 28, 2005 as he claimed was proper, rather than on the day earlier, his 
response was still not timely as it had not been filed until June 30, 2005. [Rec Index Pg 
603 Tr. 6 Line 9 - 1 9 ] 
When CST's counsel tried to convince the court that he had actually filed the 
response and the Harris affidavit by fax on June 27, 2005, the court noted that the 
Harris affidavit had not been signed until June 30, 2005. [Rec Index Pg 603 Tr. 23 Line 
9 - 1 9 ] CST's counsel then explained that he had always filed his pleadings supported 
by unsigned affidavits. [Rec Index Pg 603 Tr. 23 Line 14 -22 ] 
At the conclusion of argument, the court stated that it would be appropriate to 
allow the plaintiff his day in court and set aside the order to dismiss. However, the court 
also awarded Strickly $750.00 as reasonable attorney's fees "for having to appear and 
having to go through this." [Rec Index Pg 603 Tr. 24 Line 5 - 1 7 ] 
On March 3, 2006, more than 260 days after it served CST with its 12(b)(6) 
motion, and over 105 days after the November hearing, Strickly was served with CST's 
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proposed findings and order to set aside the default judgement, although CST never 
filed its proposed findings and order with the court. (Addendum 9; Proposed Order) 
On March 8, 2006, Strickly filed its memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's 
proposed findings of fact and order wherein Strickly complained that CST had failed to 
comply with URCP Rule 7(f)(2) which required the prevailing party to serve the 
proposed order upon the other parties within 15 days after the court's decision unless 
otherwise directed by the Court. Strickly also complained that the findings stated in 
CST's proposed findings were never stated by the Court as its findings, thus the 
proposed order did not accurately reflect the findings of the court and that the order 
made no mention whatsoever of the defendant's' arguments on such issues as URCP 
Rule 61: Harmless Error. 
On April 24, 2006 in response to Strickly's Notice to Submit filed on April 14, 
2006, the court entered a minute entry and its own "Order Setting Aside Dismissal." 
On July 20, 2006 Strickly received CST's Request for Decision which was filed 
with the Court on July 25, 2006, requesting the court to issue a decision following 
payment of the required $750.00 to Strickly. 
On July 31, 2006, the Court entered a second minute entry granting CST's 
Motion to Set Aside Default. 
On October 13, 2006 Strickly served CST with, and filed its answer, cross claim, 
and counter claim with the court, wherein Strickly alleged that (1) CST submitted 
several invoices for McCabe's work to Strickly which paid said invoices from CST upon 
receipt; (2) an accounting of said invoices subsequent to McCabe abandoning the 
Lease revealed that CST had failed to properly make the deductions required by the 
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Lease between Strickly and McCabe in a total amount of no less than $4,205.81; and 
(3) such overpayment to CST was directly and proximately caused by CST's negligent 
miscalculation of the amounts due to it and the submission of overcharged invoices to 
Strickly. 
In the Counterclaim, Strickly demanded that CST return to it the $4, 205.81 
Strickly had overpaid to CST and also demanded that McCabe repay Strickly the 
$7,718.00 he still owed for his truck engine repair. 
On October 30, 2006 CST answered Strickly's complaint. Other than to admit 
Strickly and McCabe entered into a lease agreement in 2003 and that subsequent to 
that lease, CST and McCabe entered into a factoring agreement, CST denied all of 
Strickly's allegations and listed 23 affirmative defenses. 
Other than the filing of Strickly's counterclaim, cross claim and the subsequent 
answers, as of this date no further court proceedings have occurred to resolve the 
issues raised by these pleadings. 
On March 26, 2007 the plaintiff made discovery requests to the appellant which 
were answered on April 24 and May 18, 2007. 
On November 11, 2008, the court issued an Order to Show Cause requiring the 
parties to appear on January 2, 2009 and show cause why this case should not be 
dismissed for lack of activity. 
On January 9, 2009, CST filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and Request 
for Oral Argument along with a three inch thick supporting memorandum with several 
hundred pages of exhibits and the Affidavit of Karla Harris dated December 9, 2008. 
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On page two of the 44 page memorandum. [Rec Index Pg 126], CST states that 
because Strickly had signed a form letter acknowledging that Strickly would send all 
payments owed to McCabe directly to CST and because McCabe had not reimbursed 
CST for the money McCabe had been overpaid, CST was entitled to judgment against 
Strickly and McCabe. However, nowhere in the 44 pages does CST acknowledge that 
Strickly had actually overpaid McCabe for work preformed for Strickly after the 
deductions allowed by the Lease were subtracted from his invoices. 
The memorandum also fails to acknowledge the counter claim Strickly has filed 
against CST for those amounts still due and owed to Strickly by McCabe but that were 
previously paid to CST, all of which have priority for payment over any amounts due to 
CST from any party. 
In that memorandum and the supporting affidavit [Rec Index Pg 162], CST also 
claims to have incurred $14,000.00 in legal fees in its effort to collect $5,695.31 from 
Strickly and McCabe. 
On January 16, 2009, Strickly served CST with its Memorandum in opposition to 
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment accompanied by the affidavit of Tracy Strickland 
and its Notice to submit for decision defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a 
claim or in the alternative for change of venue. 
On January 20, 2009, because it had never received any ruling on its 12(b)(6) 
motion which was originally filed with the Court some 1,235 days earlier, Strickly filed its 
Notice to submit for decision on its 12(b)(6) motion. 
On January 20, 2009, Strickly also filed its memorandum in opposition to CST's 
Motion for Summary Judgment accompanied by the affidavit of Tracy Strickland. 
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The statement made by Tracy Strickland in paragraph #12 of this affidavit [Rec 
Index Pg 565], "at the time Mike McCabe stopped working with Strickly Truckin he had 
been overpaid by several thousand dollars. Therefore, McCabe owes Strickly Truckin 
$4,205.81, not the other way around' has never been disputed by CST. The statement 
made by Tracy in paragraph #14 [Rec Index Pg 565], that "In the complaint, CST 
admits in paragraph #14 that McCabe actually received more money than he was owed 
by Strickly Truckin."has never been disputed and was admitted by CST in paragraph 
#9 of its response to Strickly's Memorandum in opposition to CSTs MSJ. [Rec Index Pg 
574] 
On February 17, 2009, although the rules allow 5 days, 32 days after CST was 
served with the memorandum in opposition to its MSJ, CST filed with the court its 
response to Strickly's Memorandum in opposition to CSTs MSJ along with a Notice to 
submit the MSJ for decision. In the last two sentences of paragraph #4 of that 
response[Rec Index Pg 571], CST stated that it was uncontroverted and thus deemed 
admitted that under the terms of the form letter signed by Tracy Strickland (Addendum 
2) Strickly was required "to send payments for the debt they owed McCabe." However, 
in paragraph #14 of its complaint, CST admits that McCabe actually received more 
money than he was owed by Strickly. 
In paragraph #11 of its Response [Rec Index Pg 574-575], CST cites UCA 70A-
9a-406 to state that "once an account debtor (Strickly in this case) receives proper 
notification that the account has been assigned, the only way to pay off that obligation 
is to pay the assignee (CST Financial). No consideration is needed to make a valid 
assignment" [Rec Index Pg 573] 
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On February 20, 2009, Strickly filed its Second Notice to submit for decision its 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. 
On February 23, 2009, 1,273 days after Strickly first filed its Motion to Dismiss 
for failure to state a claim and 830 days after the court set aside CST's default 
dismissal, CST filed its Memorandum of Points and Authorities Concerning Strickly's 
Motion to Dismiss with the court. 
On March 31, 2009 Strickly filed its Third Notice to submit for decision its motion 
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
On April 15, 2009, the court entered its six page minute entry wherein it 
dismissed Bill Strickland as a defendant, denied Strickly's 12(b)(6) motion and granted 
CST's Motion for Summary Judgment and stated that "This entry stands as the Order of 
the Court. No further order is required." 
The court provided no findings with the Order. Although Strickly had filed the 
affidavit of Tracy Strickland and referenced that affidavit in its Memorandum in 
opposition to MSJ, the Court stated that" Defendants solely present their Undisputed 
Facts, without citation to supporting materials. 
In the Order, on page 3, the court cites to Anderson v. Taylor 2006 UT 79 to 
support the statement "Our rules require "not just bald citation to authority.. ." and cited 
Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Redy Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23,1J23, in support of the finding 
that it was not harmless error for Strickly to fail to make a verbatim restatement of each 
controverted fact. 
On May 3, 2009, Strickly filed its notice of appeal. On June 18, 2009 Strickly 
filed its docketing statement with the Court of Appeals. 
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motion for over 1,270 days thereby denying Strickly its constitutional right to receive a 
remedy without unnecessary delay and it denied the motion to dismiss when faced with 
ample facts to render the correct decision to dismiss Strickly. 
When the trial court granted CST its MSJ, it did so based upon an incorrect 
interpretation of the Factoring Agreement to be a contract binding upon Strickly that 
required Strickly to pay CST amounts in excess of what it owed to McCabe under the 
preexisting Lease. Based upon that flawed interpretation, the court incorrectly granted 
the MSJ without making any specific findings for the basis of the contractual obligation, 
what the consideration had been, or even the terms of the contract which allegedly 
obligated Strictly to pay CST . 
Because the motion to dismiss and the MSJ were both incorrect decisions, they 
each should be reveres by this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court denied Strickly its 
constitutional right under Art. I; Section 11 of the Utah Constitution to receive a remedy 
without unnecessary delay. 
In this action, Strickly was forced to wait for more than 1,270 days for a response 
after it first requested relief from the court by filling a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6). 
Although Strickly cannot cite to any code, or state the maximum specified 
number of days allowed before any given type of decision is rendered by the court 
without jeopardizing the parties' right to receive justice without unnecessary delay, 
clearly there must be some upper limit of time past which the delay denies the party its 
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constitutional rights. If this were not true, then the language in Section 11 is rendered 
meaningless. 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure concerns the sufficiency of the 
pleadings, not the underlying merits of a particular case. Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §1356 (2d ed. 1990). When a 12(b)(6) 
motion is filed, the issue before the court is whether the petitioner has alleged enough 
in the complaint to state a cause of action, and this preliminary question is asked and 
answered before the court conducts any hearings on the case. Regardless of the 
cause for such delay, when this preliminary question remains unanswered for several 
years, as it did in this action, the defendant depending upon receiving that ruling before 
proceeding with very expensive litigation on the merits is severely prejudiced by the 
delay. Not only was the 12(b)(6) Motion left unanswered by the court for more than 
1,270 days, but the plaintiff CST was allowed 830 days to file its objection to the Motion 
after the court set aside CST's default, when the URCP Rule 7(c)(1) allowed 10 days 
after service for CST to file such Memoranda. 
The URCP Rule 7(c)(1) allowed CST 10 days to respond, but it took CST 98 
days after the court entered the default against CST to file its Memorandum in Support 
of Motion to Set Aside Default Certificate and even then, CST never filed the supported 
Motion to Set Aside. When, during the November 2006 hearing, the Court questioned 
CST about the lack of a Motion and the lateness of its response to thel 2(b)(6) Motion, 
at first, CST's counsel tried to convince the court that he had actually filed the response 
and the Harris affidavit by fax on June 27, 2005, but when the court noted that the 
Harris affidavit had not been signed until June 30, 2005 [Rec Index Pg 603 Tr. 23 Line 
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9 -19 ] , CSTs counsel changed his story and then explained that he had always filed 
pleadings supported by unsigned affidavits. [Rec Index Pg 603 Tr. 23 Line 14] 
The URCP Rule 7(f)(2) allowed CST 15 days after the court made its ruling 
concerning the Motion to Set Aside Default for CST to serve Strickly with the proposed 
findings and Order to set aside the default judgement. CST served the proposed Order 
more than 100 days after the November 2006 hearing. 
Strickly believes that regardless of the many causes for such delays, when the 
chain of events led to such an inordinate delay in receiving its ruling on a preliminary 
matter, Strickly was severely prejudiced by the delay and was therefore denied its 
constitutional right under Art. I; Section 11 of the Utah Constitution to receive a remedy 
without unnecessary delay. Because of this prejudice it has received, Strickly asks the 
Court of Appeals to restore his constitutional right to justice without undue delay by 
reversing the MSJ and dismissing Strickly from that part of this action. 
The second issue on appeal is whether the trial court was correct in denying 
Strickly's 12(b)(6) motion without making any factual findings that supported the ruling. 
When making the decision to dismiss an action under the provisions of URCP 
12(b)(6), the court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and 
interpret those facts and all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party." E.g., Oakwood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 2004 UT 101, U 9, 
104 P.3d 1226. 
However, here, because it had the complaint, the counter-claim and Tracy 
Strickland's Affidavit, the two contracts, the assignment letter, the Motion for Summary 
Judgment to include a MSJ memoranda with hundreds of pages of exhibits all before it 
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when undertaking the decision whether to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(6), the 
court should have been able to determine the fatal flaws existing in CST's complaint 
from Strickly's arguments and the documents the court had before it at the time of the 
decision. 
Had this truly been an action by CST against Strickly for its failure or refusal to 
honor the assignment of the right to collect the accounts receivable due to McCabe 
from Strickly to CST, then the Court would have been spot on in its denial of Strickly's 
12(b)(6) Motion and CST would have been completely correct in its denials of the need 
for it to provide additional consideration to Strickly before Strickly had any obligation to 
CST. 
However, from start to finish, this case had nothing whatsoever to do with 
Strickly's failure to honor the assignment from McCabe to CST, but rather it had 
everything to do with Strickly being forced to pay CST a debt not due from Strickly to 
McCabe, who does owe CST money, all because CST chose to ignore Strickly's 
preexisting Lease agreement that clearly precluded such debt passing from McCabe to 
Strickly. 
It is undisputed that in September 2003, Strickly and McCabe entered into a 
Lease whereby Strickly agreed to allow McCabe to use its credit to purchase the fuel, 
repairs, supplies, and services required by McCabe's trucking operations and to pay 
McCabe for this labor and use of his equipment. In exchange, McCabe agreed to use 
his equipment to haul loads for Strickly and be solely responsible for all expenses 
related to the operation and repair of his personally owned truck. (Addendum 1; 
Temporary Lease; 1J6, 7) 
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It is undisputed that the "Letter," although ambiguous, said nothing whatsoever 
about Strickly somehow becoming contractually obligated to pay any amount more than 
that which was actually due under the Lease agreement to McCabe after all applicable 
deductions for credit provided to McCabe by Strickly had been made. Yet, the trial 
court cited to Tracy Strickland's signature on that 2004 letter as the only justification 
given by CST or the trial court for CST to sue for and apparently win on Summary 
Judgment just such an obligation from Strickly. The trial court however chose not to 
cite to, or even mention Tracy Strickland's affidavit to the contrary in its ruling thereby 
ignoring the very material genuine issue of material fact of whether there was any 
obligation for Strickly to pay to anyone any more than what it truly owed to McCabe. 
When McCabe asked Strickly to forward his money to CST, Strickly honored 
McCabe's assignment of his accounts to CST. Only when McCabe stopped working 
did Strickly stop sending the money to CST. During the period from January 2004 until 
August 2004, CST submitted invoices to Strickly for a gross of $68,661.39 less 
deductions for fuel and the broker's fee in the total net amount of $51,793.25. Strickly 
paid CST $38,379.84 of the $51,793.25 based upon the invoices it had received from 
CST. Therefore, it can not be said that Strickly refused to honor the assignment and 
yet that is the exact claim made by CST in this action and accepted in error by the trial 
court when granting CST summary judgement. 
In May, 2004, when McCabe needed a $13,000 repair to the engine of his truck 
in order to keep operating, Strickly paid for the repair to McCabe's benefit with 
McCabe's acknowledgement that Strickly was entitled to regain all of the advanced 
money as provided in the Lease, to be taken as deductions from the compensation due 
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to McCabe for his future services to Strickly. Because the $13,000 could not be 
deducted from McCabe all at one time, both Strickly and McCabe agreed that Strickly 
would deduct the repair expenses from McCabe's invoices at the monthly rate of 
$3,000.00. It is undisputed that in July 2004, Strickly received an invoice from CST 
(Addendum 3; Invoice from CST to Strickly #3215 dated 7/12/2004) that showed the 
first $3,000.00 monthly deduction and in August, Strickly received an invoice from CST 
that showed the second $3,000.00 deduction for the engine repair. (Addendum 4) 
It is undisputed that CST sent its invoices showing $3,000.00 deductions for 
engine repair to Strickly for two months before McCabe quit working, and yet in 
paragraph #28 of its memorandum in support of its MSJ [Rec Index Pg 161], CST 
claimed that it knew nothing about the engine repair until after McCabe quit working 
and apparently the trial court accepted this false statement as fact. 
Once Strickly discovered that McCabe had abandoned the Lease, Strickly 
stopped any further payments to CST pending a reconciliation of McCabe's accounts 
which showed that McCabe still owed Strickly $7,178.01 for the engine repair, 
$9,543.46 for fuel, repair, and service invoices that had been charged to Strickly but not 
paid and that CST had over charged $357.75 for the Broker's fee. (Addendum 5; 
Summary of unpaid expenses). As stated in Tracy's affidavit [Rec Index Pg 565], 
Strickly informed CST of this overpayment situation and demanded a $4,205.81 refund 
from CST and demanded the balance from McCabe. 
Instead of reimbursing Strickly for the overpayment it had received from Strickly 
based upon the invoices CST had sent to Strickly, CST filed the complaint in this matter 
33 
alleging that Strickly had breached a contract with CST by not paying it the $8,655.96 
CST had demanded from McCabe. 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
"If there is no consideration, there is no contract." Copper State Leasing, 770 
P.2d 88 at 91 (citing General Ins. Co. of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 
504 (Utah 1976) "Consideration is an act or promise, bargained for and given in 
exchange for a promise... . For the mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral 
contract to constitute the consideration for each other, the promises must be binding on 
both parties.") If there is no contract, there can be no viable cause of action for a 
breach of contract. 
It is undisputed that the Strickly/McCabe Lease Agreement, which preexisted the 
CST/McCabe factoring agreement, limited Strickly's obligation to pay anyone for 
McCabe's services to the money that was left after the deductions for the costs of 
operations charged to Strickly's credit. In light of the money McCabe undisputedly 
owed to Strickly when he abandoned the Lease, CST can not establish any contractual 
obligation for Strickly to pay any money to CST unless it can establish a contractual 
obligation due from Strickly to CST separate from the Strickly/McCabe Lease and 
separate from the McCabe/CST Factoring Agreement, to which Strickly was not a party. 
In paragraph #14 of its Complaint [Rec Index Pg 3], CST correctly stated that 
". .. CST advanced Trucker more money on the bill submitted by Trucker than Broker 
actually owed CST and Trucker." Therefore CST knew at the time of making its 
complaint that under the lease agreement that was limited to only that money McCabe 
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was owed by Strickly, CST could not collect anything from Strickly without some 
separate agreement with Strickly to pay CST whatever McCabe owed to CST. 
Apparently, in order to establish the necessary separate agreement to support its 
breach action against Strickly, in its complaint, CST alleged "by implication" that CST 
had given consideration to Strickly for a bargained for agreement or promise from 
Strickly to pay CST regardless of the amount Strickly owed to McCabe. 
On its face, even without the ambiguous language, whether Tracy Strickland 
signed it or not, the CST letter sent to Strickly in January clearly fails the consideration 
test but it was specifically mentioned and used against Strickly in the court's decision to 
deny Strickly's 12(b)(6) Motion and grant CSTfs MSJ. 
This lack of consideration for a separate agreement between Strickly and CST is 
fatal to CSTs Breach of Contract action. The law is clear: if the consideration given to 
Strickly was a promise, then the promises made by the two parties must be binding on 
both parties. 545 P.2d 502, 504 Id. and yet, on its face, the 2004 letter required nothing 
from CST. 
Apparently, because CST could not show such consideration, it chose to lie to 
the trial court when, in paragraph #11 of its Response to the objection to the MSJ [Rec 
Index Pg 574-575], CST chose to materially misrepresent the law to the court by 
claiming 70A-9a-406 states that "once an account debtor (Strickly in this case) 
receives proper notification that the account has been assigned, the only way to pay off 
that obligation is to pay the assignee (CST Financial). No consideration is needed to 
make a valid assignment." 
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What the cited law really says is "After receipt of the notification, the account 
debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee and may not discharge the 
obligation by paying the assignor" which is completely different from what CST told the 
Court and the cited law says nothing whatsoever about "No consideration is needed to 
make a valid assignment" 
"A plaintiff cannot amend the complaint by raising novel claims or theories for 
recovery in a memorandum in opposition to a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment" Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1205 (7th Cir.1989); McCabeDowell 
v. Sullivan, 132 F.R.D. 501, 502 (N.D.III.1990), therefore the trial court should not have 
considered any of CST's subsequent filings in deciding the Motion to Dismiss or it 
should have considered all of the evidence before it in granting CST's MSJ. 
However, it can not be determined what the trial court relied on when making its 
decision, as no findings on those issues were announced in the decision of the court. 
Accordingly, because CST did not allege and can not establish any such 
consideration given to create the necessary separate obligation from Strickly, the Court 
should reverse the trial court's denial, or remand with instructions to dismiss CST's 
Breach of Contract action against Strickly for CST's failure to state a claim for which 
relief can be granted under the provisions of URCP, Rule 12(b)(6). 
FRAUD 
In order to establish fraudulent concealment, "a plaintiff must prove the following 
three elements: (1) the nondisclosed information is material, (2) the nondisclosed 
information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) there is a legal duty to 
communicate." Hermansen v. Tasulis, 2002 UT 52, P 24, 48 P.3d 235. 
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When CST filed its complaint in May, 2005, CST alleged that Strickly had 
committed fraud upon CST because Strickly had failed to notify CST of McCabe's 
engine repair and that the repair was not reflected on the bills submitted by CST to 
Strickly thus causing CST to overpay McCabe. However, it is undisputed that it was 
CST that sent the two invoices showing deductions for engine repair to Strickly in July 
and August, 2004. As stated above, in paragraph #28 of its response [Rec Index Pg 
160], CST falsely claimed that only after McCabe quit work did CST receive a 
$13,718.01 invoice for repairs to McCabe's truck engine. CST's claim in paragraph #39 
and 41 of its complaint [Rec Index Pg 6] and CST's claim in subsequent filings that CST 
did not know of the engine repair and therefore overpaid McCabe were each material 
misrepresentations intentionally made by CST to the trial Court. 
Just as with CST's breach claim, the only way CST could sustain a claim for 
fraud was to show Strickly had a contractual duty to inform CST of the engine repair, 
knew of this obligation, and chose not to so inform CST which was impossible because 
CST was sending the invoices showing the engine repair to Strickly, not the other way 
around. Just as with the breach claim, the only way CST could show Strickly had any 
duty to so inform CST was to falsely claim it had some separate agreement with Strickly 
supported by separate consideration. The fraud claim is fatally defective for the same 
reasons as the breach of contract claim and should likewise be dismissed. 
The third issue on appeal is whether the trial court was correct in granting CST 
a Summary Judgment and was the court incorrect when it interpreted the CST/McCabe 
Factoring Agreement to be a contract binding upon Strickly that required Strickly to pay 
CST amounts in excess of what it owed to McCabe under the preexisting Lease 
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agreement between Strickly and McCabe without making any findings that such a 
separate agreement had been formed after negotiation and the exchange of 
consideration between Strickly and McCabe. 
When it entered summary judgment in favor of CST based upon a contractual 
obligation of Strickly to CST, without making any specific findings for the basis of the 
contractual obligation, what the consideration had been, or even the terms of the 
contract, the trial court was not correct in issuing the order granting summary 
judgement. 
Summary judgment is appropriate under URCP Rule 56 only when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The Court must view all facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, Speros v. Fricke, 98 P.3d 28, 33-34 (Utah 2004). 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment 
"shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); Gerhich v. Numed, Inc., 977 
P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). 
A review of the pleadings together with the affidavits filed in this case shows that 
the trial court had in its hands Tracy Strickland's affidavit stating that between the 
unpaid loan balance and several other offsets due from McCabe at the time he stopped 
working with Strickly, he had been overpaid by several thousand dollars. This fact was 
never disputed by CST. CST admitted in paragraph #14 of its complaint [Rec Index Pg 
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3], that McCabe actually received more money from Strickly than he was owed by 
Strickly and yet none of these facts were mentioned anywhere in the decision granting 
Summary Judgment. The affidavit statement by Strickly's President Tracy clearly 
demonstrated controversy over the very material fact of: did Strickly owe any money to 
CST when its obligations were limited to paying only that what it owed McCabe? Yet 
the trial court ruled Strickly owed more money to CST than was required under its 
contract with McCabe without any findings of how much more, why, or under which 
contract Strickly took on the obligation to pay more than it owed to McCabe. 
Both of CST's stated causes of action against Strickly, for "Breach of Contract" 
and "Fraud", as found in the complaint paragraphs numbers 26 through 35 and 36 
through 43 [Rec Index Pg 4-7], by definition require that a valid and enforceable 
contract exist between CST and Strickly before any cause of action could be validly 
stated. No proof of any such contract has ever been offered by CST because no such 
contract exists. 
In rendering its decision, the trial court cited Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Redy 
Mix, Inc., 2004 UT 23, ^[23 [Rec Index Pg 590], in support of the finding that it was not 
harmless error for Strickly to fail to make a verbatim restatement of each fact that is 
controverted. In the Order, on page 3 [Rec Index Pg 591], the court cites to Anderson 
v. Taylor 2006 UT 79 to support the statement "Our rules require "not just bald citation 
to authority. . ." However, the Rule referred to therein is rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure and this was not an appellate brief, but rather a trial court brief 
that only needed to establish that one genuine issue of fact in dispute existed, while 
giving deference to all implications in favor of Strickly as the non-moving party. 
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Strickly did not make a verbatim restatement of each controverted fact simply 
because the facts alleged by CST, as alleged, are generally correct. However, as 
stated in Strickly's Memorandum in Opposition to MSJ, CST did not report anywhere in 
any of its pleadings that it based its complaint allegations solely on a factoring 
agreement between CST and McCabe to which Strickly was not a party, not upon the 
Lease contract between Strickly and McCabe that preexisted the factoring agreement 
and which limited all payments from Strickly to the benefit of McCabe to only that which 
Strickly owed to McCabe after the allowed deductions for expense were made. 
CST has admitted that said Lease agreement required Strickly to pay only what 
money it actually owed to McCabe. There is no allegation made anywhere that Strickly 
failed to pay everything it owed to McCabe under the terms of the Lease agreement. 
The only claim made by CST that any contract ever existed between CST and 
Strickly is found in the allegation made in the complaint paragraph #27 [Rec Index Pg 
4], wherein it was stated "Broker agreed to pay CST for work done by Trucker for 
Broker" The claim by CST in its Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment that 
"Strickly entered into an agreement with CST wherein it agreed to make payments due 
to McCabe directly to CST" is not factually correct in that it left out the very material 
limitation of Strickly paying to the benefit of McCabe only that which was owed under 
the terms of the Lease agreement. 
Because the trial court failed to correctly interpret the contractual obligation 
created by the "Letter" and because it did not give the proper deference to the evidence 
before it in favor of Strickly as the non-moving party, the grant of summary judgment 
should be reversed, or remanded with instructions to make adequate findings to 
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support such a ruling to include the terms of the contract, the consideration given for 
the contract or give the trial court instructions to dismiss the action against Strickly. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant Strickly Truckin Inc., believes it was deprived of its constitutional 
right under Art. I; Section 11 of the Utah Constitution to receive a remedy without 
unnecessary delay because the trial court failed for more than 1,270 days after it was 
filed with the court to rule upon Strickly's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, which is a 
preliminary motion that should have been addressed as soon as the default judgment 
against CST was set aside. Because the motion was addressed in such an untimely 
manner, Strickly was seriously prejudiced. 
Strickly believes that once the 12(b)(6) motion was finally addressed in April 
2009, the court made an incorrect decision to deny the motion, based in part on its 
incorrect interpretation of a document presented by CST to the court under which CST 
claimed the right to collect from Strickly whatever McCabe owed to CST. However, 
because Strickly was never a party to the factoring agreement, the court should have 
granted the motion to dismiss so long as there was no demonstration of separate 
consideration to support a separate agreement between Strickly and CST. Because 
the trial court was not correct as a matter of law in denying the motion, this Court should 
reverse that decision and the CST case against Strickly should be dismissed. 
Finally, because the trial court was incorrect when it interpreted the 
CST/McCabe Factoring Agreement to be a contract binding upon Strickly that required 
Strickly to pay CST amounts in excess of what it owed to McCabe under the preexisting 
Lease agreement without making any specific findings for the basis of the contractual 
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obligation, what the consideration had been, or even the terms of the contract when it 
entered summary judgment in favor of CST, the Court should reverse that decision and 
the case against Strickly should be dismissed. 
Because Strickly was awarded attorney's fees at the conclusion of the only 
hearing held, and because CST seriously delayed the course of the litigation and made 
several intentional material misrepresentations to the trial court, Strickly should also be 
awarded its fees on Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON THIS 14th Day of September, 2009. 
Gary Buhler 
Attorney for Strickly Truckin Inc. 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this September 14, 2009 ,1 served a copy of the forgoing 
document, by depositing a true and correct copy thereof in the United States Mails, 
addressed to: 
Dusten Heugly Mike McCabe, pro-se 
1375 South 100 East 




THIS AGREEMENT by and between tfYJK* f M V i W . Of ^O.CjQV^^ckingLessor, 
And Rjnsiridrland_ Of Stricklv Truckin M Lessee. 
WITNESSETH: 
The Lessor hereby leases to the Lessee the following described Motor Vehicle JE^ mnnjcnr: 
TmctorNo. \U17T License 1 X)• \ L^Tl VW \ y P ^ m ^ X ^ T O H 1 ^ 3 ( a ^ 
Trailer No. License Trailer No. License. 
For a period of: Commencing AT: 12:01A.M. The \g^ Day of figf) 20 £ £ 
And Expiring At: 11:59 P.M. The Day of, 20 . * 
1. The Lessor warrants that the said motor vehicle equipment described above is in good, sound and safe mechanical 
condition, and in all respects in full conformity with the requirements of the Department of Transportation. The lessor 
further agrees that the equipment shall be maintained at its sole expense for the duration of this agreement. 
2. The Lessor agrees that said equipment will be subject to inspection by the Lessee's agent and other authorized 
employees at the Lessee's regular inspection stations, before the start of any trip and at any place necessary en route. It 
is further understood and agreed that if, after the inspection, in the opinion of die Lessee's agent or authorized 
employees, the equipment is not safe and in proper condition, then the Lessor shall immediately have said equipment 
repaired and put in safe mechanical condition at its sole expense. 
3. The Lessor further agrees that the Lessee will not be held responsible for any damage to, or loss or destruction of said 
motor vehicie(s), as occasioned by accident, collision, upset, negligence, fire, theft, act of God, or any other means 
whatsoever while the said motor vehicle(s) is operated under the provisions of the lease, it being expressly understood 
that the said Lessor specifically hereby releases the Lessee from liability for such damage, loss or destruction of said 
equipment The Lessor further agrees to hold the Lessee harmless and free of any claims by any other patties 
whosoever having, or claiming, any interest, equitable or otherwise, in the above described motor vehicle equipment 
4. The Lessor agrees to pay all taxes for the use of the highways, forties *tid bridges, and to furnish its own supply of fuel, 
oil and maintenance of said motor vehicles, together with airy other expenses whatsoever incurred by or incidental to 
the operation of said equipment 
5. The Lessor agrees that all fuel, oil, tires* and repair parts will be obtained from independent dealers, and it is fully 
understood that the Lessee shall not be called upon to furnish any parts, supplies, or services incidental to the operation 
of the equipment other than as is herein provided, The Lessor shall immediately reimburse any parts, supplies, or 
services furnished by the Lessee in full to the Lessee or amounts due will be deducted from compensation due. 
6. All expenses incurred to operate said equipment in compliance with USDOT regulations and airy other requirements 
will be the responsibility of the Lessor during the term of this lease, Such shall include but are not limited to 
registration fees, fuel tax preparation and fees, insurance, inspections, permits, violations, etc. Any and all amounts 
incurred by Striddy Truckin in behalf of said equipment will be charged directly back to the lessor and will be deducted 
from amounts due to the Lessor. 
7. The lessor agrees to be responsible to maintain and repair the equipment in a safe and operable condition at his or her 
own expense. Any expense charged to Strickly Truckin, including ftiei and oil purchases, will be reimbursed in a 
timely manner, or will be deducted from any amounts due to the Lessor. If lessor is given a company credit card it is 
with understanding that it is for business expenses only. The lessor will be held responsible for all charges on any 
credit card given to them. 
8. The Lessor agrees to employ and furnish all drivers for said equipment and to pay the wages of said drivers while in its 
employ, it being expressly understood that such matters as Withholding Tax, Social Security Unemployment Insurance 
and Workmen's Compensation are the responsibility of the Lessor. Controlled substance testing as required by CFR 
Part 382 will/will not be the responsibility of the Lessee, 
9. The Lessor agrees to fully indemnify the Lessee for damage to property or person of a third party resulting from fire, 
theft, collision, or upset and to folly indemnify the Lessee for damage to cargo arising from any or all of these causes. 
10. When possession of the leased equipment is taken by the Lessee, said Lessee, or agent thereof, shall give to the Lessor 
of the equipment a receipt specifically identifying the equipment and stating the date and time of day possession thereof 
is taken (reference above). When the possession by the Lessee ends, the Lessor or agent thereof, shall provide to the 
Lessee a receipt specifically identifying the equipment and stating therein the date and the time of day possession is 
returned to the Lessor. 
11. The Lessor is/is not operating under the Lessee certificate of authority. The Lessee shall exercise exclusive possession 
and control over the said vehicle equipment during the time said equipment i$ operating within this lease agreement 
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172 West 9400 South 
Sandy, UT $4070 
Phone: 801-566-2028 
Fax; 801-566-1720 
CST FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC 
172 WEST 9400 SOUTH 
SANDY, UT 84070 
Attention; Accounts Payable Manager 
Fax: 
Company Name: STRICKLY TRUCKING 
RE: MIKE McCABE 
Dear Accounts Payable Manager: 
In an effort to better serve its customers MIKE McCABE , has been granted a credit facility by CST 
Financial Services LLC. As part of this financial accommodations has secured tills credit facility and 
assigned certain company assets such as accounts receivable to CST financial. 
A lock box has also been established to facilitate our financial arrangement. To the extent that you arc now 
indebted, or may in the future become indebted to the Client on any account or general intangible, payment 
there of should be made payable and mailed directly to: 
CST Financial Service LLC 
On account of 
172 West 9400 South 
Sandy, UT 84070 
Please continue to send ail 1099 tax forms directly to at their mail address MIKE McCABE 10247 SO 
LOCKSLY SANDY, \JT 84092 document signed by a CST authorized representative and acknowledged 
before a notary public. 
To ensure that your payments are applied correctly, please provide us with your Federal Tax LD. number 
and return this letter to us via tax at (SO I) 566-1720. 
FEDERAL TAX LD. NUMBER 
Our company acknowledges that all future payments will be payable and sent to CST Financial Service?) 
LLC. This agreement is binding until written notification is released. 
SIGNATURE. „ _ 
Jf you should have any questions, please contact us at 801-566-2028, We appreciate your time and attention 
to this matter. 
Credit Department 
CST Financial Services LLC 
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HEUGLY & HEUGLY, PLLC 
Dee L. Heugly, 9041 
Dusten L. Heugly, 10103 
140 North Cedar Hills Dr. Ste. 6B 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 637-3353 
Facsimile: (435) 637-6261 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDCIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CST FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, 
A Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BILL STRICKLAND, individually and 
STRICKLY TRUCKIN, a sole 
proprietorship, 
and MIKE MCCABE, individually, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER 
SETTING ASIDE DISMISSAL OF 
DEFENDANT BILL STRICKLAND AND 
STRICKLY TRUCKIN 
Civil No.:050909240 
Judge: L. A. Dever 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court pursuant to Plaintiffs 60b Motion and the 
Court having reviewed the Motion and hearing oral argument from both parties and after 
reviewing the Affidavit of Kara Harris and being otherwise fully informed. 
THE COURT FINDS that the Order dismissing defendant's Bill Strickland and Strickly 
Trackin should be set aside in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b). 
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on June 14, 2005. Prior to the day on which 
responsive memorandum was due, Defendani filed an untimely Notice to Submit, stating that 
Plaintiffs responsive memorandum was already late. Plaintiffs counsel notified Defendant's 
counsel that the Notice to Submit was untimely prior to the Court entering the Default against 
Plaintiff, but Defendant failed to take corrective action. Plaintiff then notified the Court that the 
Notice to Submit was totally improper, but the default had already been entered. Plaintiff timely 
served Defendant with a copy of Plaintiffs response to the Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs 
counsel then contacted Defendant's counsel, again concerning the wrongfully submitted Notice 
to Submit, and Defendant's counsel agreed to file a pleading to correct his mistake. Rather than 
correcting the matter, Defendant filed a pleading captioned, "Clarification of Entry of Order to 
Dismiss" and took the position that the order to dismiss was proper despite his promise to the 
contrary. The Court finds that the parties were put on notice of all pertinent issues when 
Defendant filed its Memorandum in support of Motion to Set Aside and therefore the Court will 
it as a Motion to Set Aside and that no party is prejudiced by doing so. 
The Court finds three sufficient bases to set aside the dismissal. First, Defendant's 
counsel had agreed to correct his mistake with the Court and failed to do so. The time to file a 
60b motion, under subsection 1 or 3, was extended, until Plaintiff was put on notice that 
Defendant's counsel filed the "Clarification of Entry of Order to Dismiss" instead of filing a 
pleading to correct his own error. Extending the time under Rule 60b would allow Plaintiff until 
at least October 11, 2005, three months after the "Clarification of Entry of Order to Dismiss" was 
filed to move to have the Judgment set aside. The Court finds that the Dismissal should be set 
aside based upon mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, fraud or other misconduct of 
an adverse party. 
Second, the Motion to Set Aside should be granted because of fraud upon the Court. 
Defendant's Notice to Submit falsely states that the Motion to dismiss was ripe for decision. 
Counsel for Defendant subsequently promised to the correct the error so that Plaintiff would not 
be unfairly prejudiced. He failed to do so. 
Third, Defendant's counsel failed to comply with Utah Rules of Civility and 
Professionalism, Rule 16, which requires a party to notify opposing counsel before obtaining a 
default. 
The Court finds that Plaintiff has paid $750.00 in attorney fees to Bill Strickland as 
ordered by the Court. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the order 
dismissing Bill Strickland and Strickly Truckin is stricken. Defendant Bill Strickland and 
Strickly Truckin have five (5) days plus three (3) days mailing to submit a responsive pleading to 
Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss from the date of this Order. 
DATED this day of , 2006 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable L. A. Dever 
District Court Judge 
jVP % 1 ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /$jjr day of jjl fli^Ji . , 2006,1 mailed a true and 
correct copy of the above FINDINGS OF FACT AND ORDER SETTING ASIDE 
DISMISSAL OF DEFENDANT BILL STRICKLAND AND STRICKLY TRUCKIN by 
placing same in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, to Gary Buhler, Attorney for Defendant, Bill 
Strickland, P.O. Box 229, Grantsville, Utah 84029-0229. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CST FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE McCABE, an individual, MIKE 
McCABE TRUCKING, a sole 
proprietorship, BILL STRICKLAND, an 




Case No. 050909240 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
The above entitled matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Notice to Submit for 
Decision its Motion for Summary Judgment, filed February 17, 2009, and Defendants 
Bill Strickland's and Strickly Truckin', Inc.'s Third Notice to Submit for Decision their 
Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or In the Alternative for Change of Venue, 
filed March 31, 2009. 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Summary judgment can only be granted if the record shows that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 
681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted); see Sanns v. Butterfield Ford, 
2004 UT App 203, fl6, 94 P.3d 301 ("A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis 
of the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct 
measures up to the required standard." (quoting Jackson v. Dabnev, 645 P.2d 613, 615 
(Utah 1982)). Furthermore, doubts, uncertainties or inferences concerning issues of 
fact must be construed in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary 
judgment, jd. 
Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition fails to comply with Rule 7(c)(3)(B) 
which provides: 
A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall 
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is 
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in 
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the 
opposing party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any 
dispute, supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. For any additional facts set forth in the opposing 
memorandum, each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and 
supported by citation to supporting materials, such as affidavits or 
discovery materials. 
(2008). While the Utah Supreme Court held that where an "opposing memorandum did 
not set forth disputed facts listed in numbered sentences in a separate section as 
required . . . [but], given that the disputed facts were clearly provided in the body of the 
memorandum with applicable record references, . . . the failure to comply with the 
2 
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technical requirements [is harmless]," Salt Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 
2004 UT 23, lf23, 89 P.3d 155 (citation omitted), Defendants failed to dispute the facts 
set forth in Plaintiff's thirty-eight pages of facts and forty-one exhibits, See (PL's Mem. In 
Supp. 1-38, Exs. 1-41)), including an agreement signed by Tracy Strickland 
"acknowledging] that all future payments will be payable and sent to CST Financial 
Services, LLC." \6. at Ex. 2). Defendants solely present their Undisputed Facts, without 
citation to supporting materials. See (Def.'s Mem. In Opp., 1-3). 
The Utah Supreme Court explained: 
Our rules require "not just bald citation to authority but development 
of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). As we have noted many times 
before, "[the] court is not a depository in which [a] party may dump the 
burden of argument and research." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, fl 6, 1 
P.3d 1108 (quotations and citations omitted). 
Anderson v. Taylor, 2006 UT 79,1f25, 149 P.3d 352 (citation omitted). 
Because Defendants failed to show that a genuine issue of fact exists, Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED1. Moreover, Bill Strickland is DISMISSED 
as a Defendant in the above named matter. 
1
 Plaintiff has stipulated that to not sue Defendant Bill Strickland individually, rather it will seek 
judgment against Strickly Truckin', Inc. (PL's Resp. Mem. no. 4). 
3 
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Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim or In the Alternative 
for Change of Venue 
Defendants maintain that because Plaintiff failed to show that there was a 
legitimate contract formed between the parties, Plaintiff's Breach of Contract and Fraud 
claim must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6). 
Under Utah's liberal standard of notice pleading, a plaintiff is required to submit a 
"short and plain statement. . . showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and "a 
demand for judgment for the relief." Code v. Utah Dep't of Health, 2007 UT App 390, U 
4, 74 P.3d 1134, (internal citation omitted) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)-(2)). The 
Utah Court of Appeals explained, "It is important to also note that the fundamental 
purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties 'the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute,' subject only to the 
requirement that their adversary have 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of 
the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Zoumadakis v. 
Uintah Basin Med. Ctr., 2005 UT App 325, H 3, 122 P.3d 891 (quotation omitted). A 
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss concerns the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the underlying 
merits of a particular case. Tuttle v. Olds. 2007 UT App 10, fl 14, 155 P.3d 893 (citation 
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omitted) (emphasis added). Furthermore the Utah Supreme Court stated, "[l]f there is 
any doubt about whether a claim should be dismissed for the lack of a factual basis, the 
issue should be resolved in favor of giving the party an opportunity to present its proof." 
—SI. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Moreover, the United States District Court for the District of Utah explained: 
In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), all 
well-pleaded factual allegations, as distinguished from conclusory 
allegations, are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to 
. . . the nonmoving party, [internal footnote omitted]. Plaintiff must provide 
"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 
[internal footnote omitted]. . . . But, the court "need not accept conclusory 
allegations without supporting factual averments" [internal footnote 
omitted]. "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh 
potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess 
whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim 
for which relief may be granted." [internal footnote omitted]. 
TecServe v. Stoneware, Inc.. 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58929 (D. Utah Aug. 4, 2008) 
(emphasis added). 
Because Plaintiff sufficiently stated its claims of Breach of Contract and Fraud, 
Defendants' claim for a 12(b)(6) dismissal fails. 
Furthermore, because Defendant Mike McCabe is a resident of Salt Lake 
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County, Defendants' request for a change of venue fails pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78B-3-307(1)(b)2. 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 
Claim or In the Alternative for Change of Venue is DENIED. 
This Minute Entry stands as the Order of the Court. No further order is required. 
Dated 14th day of April, 2009. 
BY THE COURT. 
2Provides in relevant part, "(1) in all other cases an action shall be tried in the county in which 
(b) any defendant resides at the commencement of the action " (2008) 
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